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This article has attempted to explain why the military has 
remained a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. Its 
purpose was to test a hypothesis that posited that the colonial 
authority structure and the 1947 partition-oriented structural 
dynamics provided an important structural construct in 
explaining politics and the military in post-colonial Pakistan.
To explain and analyse the problem, the study used books, 
journals, newspapers and government documents for quantitative/
explanatory analysis. The analysis has focused on the military 
in the colonial authority structure in which the former, along 
with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class, formed 
an alliance to pursue politico-economic interests in British 
India. The article has also explained and analysed the partition-
oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory (Kashmir) 
and population (Indian refugees). The findings proved that these 
‘structural dynamics’ have affected politics and the military in 
Pakistan.
The theoretical framework in terms of ‘praetorian oligarchy’ has 
been applied to structurally explain colonial politics as well as 
politics and the military in Pakistan. The study treated Pakistan 
as a praetorian state which structurally inherited the pre-partition 
‘praetorian oligarchy’. This praetorian oligarchy constructed 
‘Hindu India’ as the enemy to pursue politico-economic interests. 
The military, a part of praetorian oligarchy, emerged from this as 
a powerful political actor due to its coercive power. It has sought 
political power to pursue economic objectives independently.
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The partition of British India gave birth to two independent 
states of India and Pakistan in August 1947. Contrary to India which 
got established democratic institutions, Pakistan set for the opposite. 
The bureaucrats ruled the country with the military as an ally until 
the late 1950s (Alavi, 1990). In 1958, the military overtly intervened 
into politics and governed the country until 1971.
A civilian, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, served as prime minister for 
almost five years until the late 1970s. In July 1977 martial law was 
again declared in Pakistan by the military, led by General Zia. The 
military regime ruled the country for next eleven-and-a-half years. 
However, the post-Cold War period permitted civilian politicians to 
perform on the political platform of Pakistan. After a decade or so, 
the civilian leadership was once again sent home by another military 
coup, this time led by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999. 
Since then, soldiers have run the country.
One wonders why the military is still a powerful political 
institution/force in Pakistan in the 21st century when most of other 
the former military-ruled countries, such as Turkey, have witnessed, 
at least, procedural democracy. 
This article considers the military rule in Pakistan as an 
important structural development which has extremely influenced 
the state and society. An attempt to explain the nature of military 
rule would help us analyse the nature of politics, state, and the civil 
society in Pakistan.
Even contemporaneously, the US-led war on terrorism, 
the unresolved issues between nuclear India and Pakistan, and 
Washington’s geo-strategic concerns in South Asia in terms of 
China’s containment, a military role of Pakistan is demanded by such 
geostrategic developments. Thus, a Pakistan governed by soldiers 
offers little for the admirer of parliamentary democracy and peace. In 
this complex national and regional geopolitical scenario, it becomes 
necessary to explain politics and the military in Pakistan.
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Aim of the research 
This article is about the military and politics in Pakistan. The 
research problem posed in this study is to explain why the military is 
still a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan. The purpose of 
the study is to test a hypothesis that the colonial authority structure 
and the experience of Partition (1947) have oriented structural 
dynamics in providing an important structural construct which 
explains politics and the military in post-colonial Pakistan.
In this respect, the study will deal with following questions:
	Whether the military played any political role under the British;
	Whether there were factors which helped the military become 
politically a powerful institution in Pakistan;
	The way the military achieved its powerful political status
As will be explained, the country has witnessed a power game 
among various political and non-political forces – i.e., the civil-
military bureaucracy and political community. It is, however, the 
structure of the state which determines the power dynamics in the 
country. Therefore, I tend to explain the research problem from a 
historical-structural perspective.
Literature review
There is an abundance of literature on military, civil-military 
relations, and general politics in Pakistan. I have used the following 
typology in order to categorise different literature: 
•	 Propagandists: those who look at the military as an instrument of 
nation building and a modernising force.
•	 Conspiracy theorists: those who view the military as conspiring 
with foreign powers, especially the US, to gain and consolidate its 
power at the expense of political forces.
•	 Instrumentalists: those who see the military from the prism of 
external forces.
•	 Elite bargain theorists: who tend to view political developments 
from the elite perspective.
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of the Pakistani state. 
This is informed by the work of Siddiqa (2007), who used this 
typology. However, I have included my own sources, language, and 
analysis to the present typology. Moreover, I have included elite 
bargain theorists, below.
To begin with, authors such as General Fazle Muqeem Khan 
(1960:67-199), Huntington (1968:250-255), Burki (1991:1-16) 
and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema (2002:135-158) have viewed the military 
as a nation builder. Being the most modern institution, the military 
has inserted itself into politics. Incompetent political leadership 
has compelled an otherwise reluctant military to govern. This 
propagandist literature has virtually regarded military as a neutral 
political umpire with a natural desire to serve as protector of the 
state. It simply has not explained the causes which force the military 
to intervene in politics.
The work of Ayesha Jalal (1991:27-135), Saeed Shafqat (1997:7-
15, 35-57), Tariq Ali (1970:74-144) and Husain Haqqani (2005:41-
250) has constituted the second type which has painted the military 
as highly exploitative in fulfilling its institutional and organisational 
interests. Jalal even argued that the Pakistan army aligned with 
Britain and then with the US in an attempt to underscore national 
political forces. 
Her narrative, however, was based on a linear-historical 
description of events that explained the inactivity of the civilian 
leadership. The civil bureaucracy was viewed as a rent-seeking 
institution, materially and politically benefiting through its alliance 
with Washington. The relative strength of political institutions was 
next to nothing as there was an underlying conspiracy to strengthen 
bureaucracy at the expense of social and political forces in Pakistan.
Jalal (1995:16-38) has further elaborated her previous work 
with no significant analytical modifications. In both of her accounts, 
the author has treated bureaucracy, particularly the military, as a 
post-independence phenomenon. Similarly, Shafqat, while viewing 
the military as a post-independence phenomenon, has developed 
117
PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012
the concept of the ‘military-dominant party hegemonic system’ to 
discuss politics from Zulfiqar Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto.
He has treated the pre-1971 period as partially hegemonic –
which could be considered arguable. In addition, the writer has only 
emphasised the political hegemony of the military, thus ignoring 
socio-economic dimensions of the concept. 
The instrumentalist view has been comprised largely of the work 
by Stephen Cohen (2004: 87-130 see also 1984). In his two books 
on Pakistan and its army, he has shed light on the regimental and 
organisational aspects of Pakistan Army from the prism of the US 
interests. The author, however, has not touched the domestic factors 
in analysing the civil-military relations in the country.
The so-called elite bargain approach, as applied by Maya Chadda 
(2000:13-97, 226-232), has narrated the politics in Pakistan from the 
elitist mindset. This has been essentially marked as a supreme force 
capable of using even coercive measures to democratise, integrate and 
consolidate the state in Pakistan. One simply wonders whether the 
elite — civil-military bureaucracy, and politicians — ‘consolidated’ 
the country in 1971.  But this approach is defective, as it creates the 
myth of an elitist leadership riding over a monolithic nationalism. 
Moreover, it reduces or better ignores the role of the masses in 
shaping the political developments in the country. In addition, it 
implicitly encourages the armed forces to apply unnecessary violence 
in the name of national consolidation to fulfil its own institutional 
and organisational interests. 
The military’s power has been studied as a structural problem 
by Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990), Hassan Askari Rizvi (2000: 51-240), 
Mohammad Waseem (1994: 42-59, 85-101) and Ayesha Siddiqa 
(forthcoming). Alavi’s theoretical work, with respect to state and its 
dominant classes, has doubtlessly been monumental.
According to him, the state in his Marxian context was an 
‘overdeveloped’ structure having strong capitalist links with the 
‘metropolitan bourgeoisie’. The ‘landed-feudal’ class, along with the 
‘indigenous bourgeoisie’, were striving to collaborate with the civil 
bureaucracy to further their interests politically, economically, and 
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The thrust of Alavian thought is that the bureaucracy is central 
to the state structure in Pakistan, whereby the state functions 
autonomously of the dominant ‘classes’. In their bid for political 
power, when engulfed by political crisis the three classes — landed-
feudal class, indigenous bourgeois, and metropolitan bourgeois — 
resort to the bureaucracy and the charismatic military for arbitration.
Despite the significance of Alavi’s work, room for improvement 
remains. For instance, the author has not been clear about the concept 
of ‘overdeveloped’ state. How and why has he assumed so? Would the 
state be considered overdeveloped vis-à-vis civil society? If yes, then 
the dominant landed feudal and indigenous bourgeoisie would be 
part of the society and they would be developed at least functionally 
in enhancing their politico-economic interests. 
Another way to understand Alavi’s thesis is by looking at state 
institutions. If we look at the elected institutions such as parliament, 
then sadly we find that they have not established themselves even 
after 58 years. The only developed state institution is, as we see later, 
the civil-military bureaucracy which, it seems, Alavi in his Marxian 
‘peripheral capitalism’ paradigm has equated with an ‘overdeveloped’ 
state. 
Similarly, Rizvi’s work is mainly about the corporate interests 
of the officer cadre. Their personal interests are dubbed national 
interests. Unfortunately, this work has been more descriptive than 
analytical, and has taken the military as a post- independence 
phenomenon.
On the other hand, Waseem has very convincingly established 
the transformative links from the colonial civil bureaucracy to the 
new state of Pakistan. The civil bureaucracy was well trained and 
disciplined in the art of administration and politics under the 
British. Pakistan inherited a good share of this ‘colonial legacy’ which 
underscored the existence of political and social forces due to the 
structural nature of the colonial state.
Waseem, however, has paid little attention to the non-civil 
bureaucracy — the military — which has been part and parcel of the 
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colonial state structure, as shall be explained later. Besides, the author 
has believed in the continuum of the rule of law since partition. I 
would challenge this argument by emphasising the superficiality of 
the rule of law.
Finally, Ayesha Siddiqa has explained for the first time the 
internal economy of the military. The military economically emerges 
as a ‘class’ in Pakistan due to its economic ventures. The originality 
of this work aside, the author, like others, has taken the military 
as a post-independence phenomenon. In addition, she, like Alavi, 
seemed to have equated the state with the military class. Besides 
this, the military has been explained as an instrument of the civil 
bureaucracy and political leadership.
Theoretical framework
Having reviewed the literature I found that none of the work 
has touched on the military as a pre-partition phenomenon. None 
has attempted to explore and explain the colonial authority structure 
in terms of identifying the colonial military, its politics and its 
economy. In addition, there has been a lack of analysis in terms of 
explaining the structural links of colonial military and its economy 
with that of Pakistan.
To explain the politics in Pakistan where the civil-military 
bureaucracy has played an important role in terms of influencing 
state institutions and the civil society, I tend to apply the concept of 
‘praetorian oligarchy’ or praetorianism. This pertains to a society and/
or state where religious, feudal, and armed forces form an alliance to 
rule the roost.
Praetoriansim has theoretically been defined and developed 
by many authors such as Perlmutter (1974: 5), who has argued 
that “praetorianism has exited in all historical periods”. Military 
intervention in politics in the democratising societies has been 
analysed as a common phenomenon by such authors.
The level of political culture of a given society to a large 
extent determines the course of its political development. In this 
respect, Huntington (1968: 80) has introduced the concept of 
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‘oligarchical praetorianism’ where the influential social forces were 
“the great landowners, the leading clergy, and the wielders of the 
sword” (Huntington 1968: 199). He further argued that: “...the 
most important causes of military intervention in politics are not 
military but political and reflect not the social and organisational 
characteristics of the military establishment but the political and 
institutional structure of the society” (1968: 194).
Similarly, Amos Perlmutter (1974:4-20) has also developed 
the praetorian perspective in terms of military praetorianism, 
whereby the military played “a highly significant role in key political 
structures and institutions”. In addition, he has identified two types 
of praetorian armies: the arbitrator army and the ruler army. The 
arbitrator military, having established its writ, preferred to return 
to barracks due to time limits, acceptable social order, lack of 
independent political organisation, and fear of civilian retribution, 
etc. The ruler type of military has a propensity to stay in power. In 
this approach, the military remained the dominant political power 
and was bent on maximising its power and perks. 
In Modern Authoritarianism, Perlmutter (1981:1-13) has 
categorised praetorianism as one type of a modern authoritarian 
system. The types of modern authoritarianism are dominated by 
oligarchic political elites. The military as a ‘parallel and auxiliary’ 
institution is used as instrument by the political elite in praetorian-
authoritarianism.
Thus, the thrust of the above-mentioned theoretical framework 
is on oligarchy/alliance of the landed feudal, armed forces, and clergy. 
This oligarchy theoretically becomes praetorian then when military is 
included. Overall, the existence of a praetorian oligarchy marks a low 
level of political culture in a given society, as argued by Huntington.
To explain my research problem, I have tended to apply 
‘praetorian oligarchy’ as a theoretical framework on the colonial state 
and society. I have argued that the Alavian landed-feudal class and 
civil-military bureaucracy form a ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to pursue its 
politico-economic interest in British India.
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Similarly, I have applied the same framework on the post-
colonial state of Pakistan where the state, to be explained later, has 
inherited the ‘praetorian oligarchy’ consisting of landed-feudal class 
and the civil-military bureaucracy.
I have, however, excluded clergy from this Huntingtonian 
‘oligarchical praetorianism’. Instead, I have argued that clergy was 
auxiliary/supportive to the landed feudals and the civil-military 
bureaucracy. Besides, unlike Perlmutter and Siddiqa, I have not taken 
the military as auxiliary or as an instrument of the civil bureaucracy 
and the landed-feudal class.
Rather, I have argued that the military was a colonial phenomenon 
and, structurally, was a part of colonial praetorian oligarchy which 
existed in British India as we shall see. In post-partition Pakistan the 
military intervened in politics due to its structural understanding 
with the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy to perpetualise its politico-
economic interests.
I have also argued that the military in Pakistan’s politics did 
not function independently but, rather, was part of the praetorian 
oligarchy. However, within this praetorian oligarchy it has become 
Perlmuter’s ‘ruler’ military.
Besides, adhering to the new version of structuralism, I have 
used the state as ‘autonomous’ from dominant classes. In addition, I 
have tended to emphasise the centrality of the state. The dominant 
classes and even institutions — civil-military bureaucracy — function 
within the state and not as the state (Steans and Pettiford 2005: 55-
58, 86-88).
Methodology 
The existing material on military and politics in Pakistan is 
mostly descriptive, theoretically ambiguous, and highly pro-military. 
More importantly, it does not take the military’s politics as a pre-
partition phenomenon as mentioned earlier. Therefore, there are 
many missing links needing to be explained.
Thus, in order to explain the research problem I have tended 
to test a hypothesis which was also the purpose of this study. The 
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orientated structural dynamics provide an important structural 
construct in explaining politics and the military in Pakistan. This 
hypothesis is expected to help us explain the military and politics in 
the post-colonial state of Pakistan.
In order to test the hypothesis, I came across a book published 
in 2005 by Tan Tai Yong. The book was a first of its kind and was 
originally a doctoral dissertation. It convincingly discusses the 
colonial military and its politics in the Punjab from 1849 to 1947. 
I have relied on this book in terms of quantitative/qualitative facts 
to explain the military’s role in the colonial authority structure. 
However, this was a secondary source. In addition, I have referred to 
another book (originally a doctoral dissertation) to explain the role 
of civil bureaucracy in the British authority structure. The book also 
covered general politics of colonial India.
To explain the phenomenon of the 1947 partition, I was able to 
go through another original work published for the first time in 2005 
in the form of a book. This secondary source has helped me a lot 
in terms of explaining the partition from colonial perspective. This 
work refuted the earlier theories with respect to London’s plans to 
divide India. In addition, I accessed some primary material in terms 
of the Pakistan Census Report (1951) to quantitatively explain the 
impact of Indian refugees (mohajirs) on Pakistani politics.
I had planned to conduct interviews with military personnel 
in order to gain insights into the military’s politics and economic 
ventures to explain my research problem. Unfortunately, the 
accessibility to the concerned persons was made difficult due to their 
strategic engagement — i.e. war on terror.
To solve this problem, I gained accessed to one Pakistani security 
analyst with expertise on the country’s military and its economic 
activities. I have used this source quantitatively to explain military’s’ 
economic role. The source, however, was treated as secondary. 
Besides, I have cited another primary source — the Parliamentary 
Directory (a government document) — to explain the socio-cultural 
background of Pakistan’s current parliament. 
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Also, I have used another primary source in the Pakistan 
Planning Commission’s Report on poverty incidence during the last 
four years. This source has been used quantitatively. Thus, I have 
used secondary sources — i.e., books, journals, and newspapers 
— at times quantitatively to explain and analyse politics and the 
military in Pakistan. In addition, primary sources, such as reports, 
have been mostly used for quantitative analysis. I have relied on 
quantitative facts in the data collected because it would help to test 
my hypothesis, answer the questions, and analyse the problem with 
the help of theoretical framework.
Finally, I am aware that I have mainly focused on Pakistan’s 
military and general politics. Also, I have excluded a very useful 
narration of political developments, such as a detailed description 
of Pakistan’s partition in 1971 or nuclear tests in 1998, due to space 
constraints. Since the ambition was to explain the problem which 
has not been dealt with, unnecessary details have been avoided so to 
fully concentrate on the problem instead. 
Disposition
I have divided this article into three parts. The first part explains 
and analyses the colonial authority structure. It argues that the 
praetorian oligarchy existed in British India. The 1947 partition is 
also explained from a colonial perspective. In addition, this chapter 
highlights partition-oriented structural dynamics.
The second part deals with politics in post-partition Pakistan. An 
attempt is made to explain whether the colonial authority structure 
and the partition-oriented structural dynamics have any bearing 
on politics and the military in the post-colonial state of Pakistan. 
Besides, this part argues that the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy 
was structurally inherited by the Pakistani state. The military being a 
component of this oligarchy emerges powerful politico-economically 
due to the structure of the state and society. 
The last part explains the partition and disintegration of Pakistan 
in 1971. The new state inherited the Punjab-based ‘praetorian 
oligarchy’ from the old state of Pakistan. This part generally explains 
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until present. The findings of the three parts are surmised in the 
conclusion.
Colonial politics
This part explains the colonial authority structure. It explains 
how the civil-military bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class formed 
a praetorian oligarchy/alliance to pursue their politico-economic 
interests in British India. The chapter also explains the partition of 
British India in 1947. The partition-oriented structural dynamics are 
also highlighted in this chapter. 
Colonial authority structure
The authority structure of the British Empire comprised 
the governor-general, the viceroy and the state bureaucracy. This 
power system was answerable via the sectary of state to the British 
parliament in London. The state bureaucracy was an integral part of 
this authority structure. 
The state acted as an interventionist force to pursue its capitalist 
interests. In this respect, it was the bureaucracy which enjoyed an 
arbitrary position in terms of bureaucratic paternalism. The role of 
the landed feudal was effectively reduced by the state-led economic 
mechanism, affected and regulated in turn by the market. The state 
penetrated and influenced civil society through the bureaucracy 
(Waseem 1994: 27-28).
The forces of colonialism gradually replaced the Moghul state 
(empire) structure. Bengal and the Punjab succumbed to the British 
East India Company in the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries 
respectively. The British developed an operative ‘institutional’ setup 
for the administration of the colonial society. The political economy 
of colonialism made the state act as promoter, guarantor, and 
protector of British capitalist interests in India. On the other hand, 
the state functioned as an organisation ‘relatively autonomous’ of 
these interests as well as from local politico-economic forces (Waseem 
1994: 21-27).
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Waseem, however, has not differentiated between the types of 
colonial state bureaucracy. His sole emphasis on the civil bureaucracy 
has not given a complete picture of the colonial authority structure. 
Tan Tai Yong, has, however, convincingly established the linkage 
between the landed-feudal class and the British military, forming the 
praetorian oligarchy in pursuit of politico-economic interests.
Yong has emphasised the ‘culture of militarism’ of the pre-
colonial Punjab. India throughout its history witnessed invasions 
from its northern parts called the Punjab. In the wake of the Moghul 
decline, the Punjab was conquered and governed by Maharaja Ranjit 
Singh. He raised his own army mainly comprising Punjabi Sikhs. 
The East India Company regime annexed the Punjab in 1849. The 
next decade saw demilitarisation of the defeated Ranjit’s army. The 
1857 mutiny, however, made the British re-evaluate the strategic 
importance of the Punjab as well as the Punjabis who had earlier 
supported the ‘military-fiscal state’ of the company’s rule (Yong 
2005: 19-51).
In the 1880s soon after the Second Afghan War, the colonial 
masters perceived the so-called ‘great game’ that was the Russian 
threat. The ‘martial races’ concept was developed by the British 
authorities to ‘divide and rule’ not only the armed forces but also 
India. The ‘Punjabicisation’ of the colonial military initiated the 
recruitment of Punjabi Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans of north 
India — the military districts  —  into the restructured Bengal Army 
(Yong 2005: 57-89).
In the 1890s the opening of ‘canal colonies’ initiated a process 
of land allocation by the colonial masters to win the loyalty of the 
soldiering classes. In 1900 the Land Alienation Act was passed by the 
state to stop land slipping out of hands of the landed-feudal class. 
Coincidentally, this landed-feudal class consisted of ex-soldiers, 
pensioners, and relatives of in-service army personnel. From 1914-
1919, the Punjab provided a majority of recruits to safeguard the 
colonial interests in Asia, Africa, and Europe (Yong 2005: 90-108).
The war years brought close collaboration between the civil 
and military authorities, giving birth to the concept of ‘militarised 
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with the political uprisings of, for example, the Khilafat movement, 
threatened the socio-economic balance in the rural-military districts. 
As a result, civil-military cooperation in terms of Punjab Soldiers’ 
Boards was further consolidated (Yong 2005: 141-182).
This civil-military integration was a planned mechanism to 
prevent the recruiting districts being influenced by nationalist politics 
of the post-war period. In other words, the British authorities were 
instrumental in the creation of praetorian oligarchy. Thus, during the 
inter-war period (1919-1939), the Punjab Soldiers Board functioned 
as an institutional part of the district administration (see Alavi 1988).
However, the nationalist movement gained momentum during 
the inter-war period. The raj was political, too. In revising the 
1909 Morley-Mitno reforms, it blessed the Indians with limited 
representation by introducing Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 
1919. However, in post-reformist India, both the Congress and the 
League failed to make political in-roads into the praetorian Punjab 
which provided 60 percent of the Indian army by 1927. Instead, 
the Punjab-based Unionist Party, an alliance of Hindu, Muslim, and 
Sikh landed feudal, held on to power until the last days of the raj. The 
Unionist Party clearly represented the praetorian oligarchy, especially 
in the military districts of northern Punjab (Yong 2005: 241-280).
Thus, it is argued that the colonial authority structure comprised 
both the civil and military bureaucracy, along with the governor-
general and viceroy. The British recruited Punjabis in large numbers 
from late 19th century onward to the British Indian Army to secure 
the imperial boundaries from the Russian threat. The British won 
the loyalty of the military districts in northern Punjab through a 
systemic allocation of land. In the inter-war period, the civil-military 
bureaucracy and landed feudal collaborated with one another 
politically and economically. Their collaboration gave birth to a 
praetorian oligarchy in British India.
The strategic partition 
There are numerous theories with respect to the partition of 
British India. Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990) has advanced the ‘salariat 
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theory’, arguing that the salaried classes, such as lawyers of United 
and Central provinces, as well as Bengal and the Punjab, strove 
constitutionally to safeguard their economic interests. However, 
Khalid bin Sayeed has emphasised Muslim separatism. His thesis was 
based on civilisational differences between the Muslims and the non-
Muslims of India. Sayeed, undoubtedly, represented the two-nation 
theorists (Sayeed 1967:4).
Waseem, on the other hand, has based his findings on 
multiplicity of variables. Structurally, the Pakistan Movement started 
in the Muslim-minority provinces. Ideologically, it was the two-
nation theory that served as an ideology. Organisationally, it was the 
Muslim League which provided the platform to the Indian Muslims. 
Personally, it was Jinnah’s Weberian charisma that was the driving 
force. Nonetheless, Waseem, if studied deeply, also belongs to the 
two-nation strand (Waseem 1994:59-83).
Similarly, Jalal (1991:16) also laid emphasis on the personality 
factor. She, however, differed from others in the sense that Jinnah 
was not necessarily struggling to win independence. His acceptance 
of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946 marked his political resilience. 
Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a bargaining chip to maximise 
the Muslims’ interests, argued Jalal.
The academic value of the above-mentioned theories appreciated, 
I instead tend to explain the partition phenomenon from the colonial 
perspective. After all, it was the British, not the Congress or the 
Muslim League, which partitioned the sub-continent.
In this respect, in his recently published work In the Shadow of 
the Great Game, Narendra Singh Sarila has convincingly unfolded 
the story of India’s partition. His thesis was based on declassified 
archival facts about the way the British made policies to preserve its 
geostrategic concerns during the Second World War.
The Congress, due to its own nationalist politics, resigned 
from the office in eight out of 11 provinces in 1939 just after the 
war broke out in Europe. On the other hand, the British wanted 
to have a strife-free Punjab (where it recruited 50 percent of the 
British Indian Army). In this respect, the Muslim League and its 
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in announcing the British declaration on 8 August 1940, acceded the 
‘veto’ to Jinnah on India’s future constitutional developments. Even 
the Unionist leadership, which was part of the praetorian oligarchy, 
was urged by Lord Linlinthgow to enter into electoral alliance with 
the League. Jinnah, who thought on communal lines much earlier 
in 1939, conversed with Lord Linlinghtgow that the “Muslim areas 
should be separated from ‘Hindu India’ and run by Muslims in 
collaboration with Great Britain” (Sarila 2005: 34-64).
In the wake of poor British performance in the war, the 
division in the Imperial army, the Congress’s demand for a free-India 
and the League’s ‘autonomous’ rhetoric, it was Lord Wavell, not 
Mountbatten, who first blueprinted the future of Pakistan on 6/7 
February 1946. Responding to a telegram to the secretary of state for 
India, Wavell, while forwarding his scheme, gave great importance 
to the communists’ interventionist designs towards the Middle East 
(the wells of power), and rest of Asia (Sarila 2005: 194-196).
To contain and combat this menace, the support of the Muslims 
was crucial. In this respect, an independent Pakistan was perceived to 
serve as a military base in fulfilling the British strategic aims. Hence, 
British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Bengal and 
the Punjab were also partitioned into East Bengal (in Pakistan) and 
East Punjab (in India) in August 1947. The princely states, including 
Kashmir, were denied independence by London. Soon after the 
transfer of authority to India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947, 
the two countries started integrating the princely states under the 
partition formula (Sarila 2005:330-336).
Therefore, it is in this context of partition that the issue 
of Kashmir’s integration and the cross-border migration needs 
explanation. Moreover, I have termed such developments as ‘partition-
oriented structural dynamics’ because they were part of the colonial 
state in terms of territory and population. I would explain later how 
these ‘structural dynamics’ affected the military and politics in post-
partition Pakistan.
Thus, it has been argued that the British authority structure was 
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decisive in terms of policy making and implementation. Moreover, 
the Punjab proved crucial as a recruiting ground for the Imperial 
army. The soldiering classes were granted land in order to win their 
loyalty and depoliticise them. The British strategically partitioned 
India on communal lines in August 1947. Moreover, the partition 
left a legacy of ‘structural dynamics’ that have affected the state of 
Pakistan as we see in the next chapter.
Praetorian Pakistan
This part argues that Pakistan is a praetorian state which 
inherited the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy. Also, it explains if 
the colonial authority structure and the partition oriented structural 
dynamics affect politics and the military in Pakistan.
Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy
Territorially, Pakistan inherited North West Frontier Province, 
West Punjab (onward Punjab), East Bengal, Sind, and a few princely 
states including Bahawalpur, whose rulers under the partition formula 
acceded to Pakistan. The British Balochistan, comprising princely 
states of Kharan, Lasbela, and Kalat, was raided by the Pakistan army 
in March 1948, annexing it with the latter (Tariq Ali 1983:123; Jalal 
1991:93). In addition, the country had to struggle to get its material 
— i.e. bank balance, and arsenal — and non-material — i.e. military 
personnel, and bureaucrats — shares (Rizvi 2000: 35-61; Haqqani 
2005: 11-12).
Besides, Pakistan received in total more than seven million 
Indian refugees (mohajirs) of which more than five million settled in 
Punjab alone – two percent of which came from United provinces 
and mostly settled in urban Sind, i.e. Karachi (Census of Pakistan 
1951: 11-25). The Muslim League and its leadership, including 
Jinnah, were migratory as well. Punjab and Bengal emerged as the 
two largest provinces in area and population.
Scholars and analysts have so far focused on those mohajirs who 
spoke Urdu and settled in urban Sind (Waseem 1994: 102-111). I 
instead argue that the politics of Punjabi mohajirs in particular and 
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politics and the military in Pakistan.
The colonial authority structure, in terms of civil-military 
bureaucracy, was structurally transformed into the Pakistani state. As 
mentioned earlier, up until partition the Punjabis had made up 50 
percent of the British Indian Army. Therefore, Punjabis, both local and 
mohajirs, outnumbered even majority Bengalis in the armed forces of 
Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan inherited a good share of colonial civil 
bureaucracy. The local-mohajir Punjabis outgrew all other ethnic 
groups in the Pakistan’s civil services (Waseem 1994:108). Besides, 
the landed feudal class of Punjab was institutionally well organised to 
assert itself politically (Alavi 1990). So, this overwhelming position 
of Punjabis was one of the dynamics of partition which affected the 
structure of state and military in Pakistan.
Thus, it is argued that the over-representation of Punjabis in 
the civil-military bureaucracy, along with the Punjabi landed feudal 
class, confirms the structural significance of pre-partition praetorian 
oligarchy which institutionally remained unaffected by the partition. 
Pakistan inherited this praetorian oligarchy, it is argued. In addition, 
I have termed this ‘Punjabicisation’ as a ‘Punjab-based praetorian 
oligarchy’ which exploited the country politically and economically.
Overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy
The Punjabis outnumbered all other ethnic communities in 
the civil-military bureaucracy, as explained earlier. The civil-military 
bureaucracy consolidated its numerical strength in the absence of 
indigenous leadership and any political organisation. In other words, 
the migratory political leadership proved ineffective in putting the 
civil-military bureaucracy under permanent civilian control.
In post-partition Pakistan, Jinnah, the governor-general, was all 
powerful under the amended 1935 India Act (Alavi 1990). However, 
Jinnah and the Muslim League had little to say in areas now 
constituting the state of Pakistan. The praetorian oligarchy remained 
unaffected by the partition process. It provided little space to the 
ailing Jinnah and disenchanted Liaquat Ali Khan, the country’s first 
prime minister (Alavi 1990).
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Instead, owing to the peculiar nature of the state which 
inherited an ‘overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy’ and an ill-
representative Muslim League, the civil bureaucracy emerged from 
within the praetorian oligarchy as a powerful political actor due to its 
expertise in the art of administration. In the name of the governor-
general, the Punjabi bureaucrats established a hitherto unknown post 
of ‘secretary general’ and a ‘planning committee’ directly responsible 
to Jinnah who by that time was bed-ridden. Choduary Mohammad 
Ali, the secretary general and later prime minister of Pakistan, by-
passed Liaquat Ali Khan and his cabinet in terms of policy making 
and its implementation (see Alavi 1990).
It was this Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy which feared the 
majority Bengalis who demanded a constitution and general election. 
To do injustice to the Bengalis, it was Jinnah himself who declared 
Urdu a national language in East Bengal in March 1948. It was not 
to suggest that Jinnah represented this oligarchy. 
It has, however, been argued that the civil bureaucracy was the 
real power holder and a think-tank responsible for policy input for 
the administrative state of Pakistan. Thus, the praetorian oligarchy 
had no objection to Urdu in the name of so-called nation building 
(Rahman 1998: 200-209).
On the other hand, the military as part of the praetorian 
oligarchy did not lag behind in terms of power projection. I have 
explained it by again looking at partition. As mentioned before, the 
‘strategic partition’ was done in order to use Pakistan as a military 
base. Therefore, the British had opted for a joint defense council 
for India and Pakistan. Claude Auchinleck was joint commander-
in-chief of Indian and Pakistani armed forces. All three services of 
Pakistan were headed by British officers in the initial years (Rizvi 
2000: 41).
Jalal (1991: 118), in this respect, has argued that the British 
deliberately did so as they wanted to make Pakistan dependent 
on London for its defense needs. Her argument was in line with 
Sarila, as we have seen before. However, this type of argumentation 
underscores the value and the purpose of partition. Instead, it has 
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global power calculations – in particular, as an anti-communist force. 
The assumption of the officer cadre of Pakistan’s armed forces by the 
British was primarily due to the ineffective political leadership of 
Pakistan which had failed badly to take defense into its own hands.
Table 1 Defense expenditure: 1949-1958
Year Defense expenditure
(Rs. million)
Percentage of the 
total government 
expenditure











    1958-59** 996.6 50.9
 * 15 August 1947 to 31 March 1948,  ** 1 April 1958 to 30 June 1959
Source: Rizvi 2000
The most significant development was the establishment in 
1953 of Fauji Foundation (Soldier Foundation), which ventured into 
textile, sugar, and cereals in the name of meeting army personnel’s 
welfare (Siddiqa 2003). Also, military personnel largely benefited 
due to its political position in the praetorian oligarchy with respect to 
the redistribution of evacuee land –land left behind by non-Muslims 
who migrated to India in 1947. This land was leased for 99 years 
to the military for operational purposes which appropriated it for 
personal gains (Siddiqa 2007).
This aspect of the military’s economic activism makes one 
remember the pre-partition land allocation to the military classes 
by the British. Thus, in independent Pakistan, the military as an 
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important component of the praetorian oligarchy strove on its own 
to secure its economic interest in the security state of Pakistan.
Political military
On 8 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza declared martial 
law in the country. The 1956 constitution and the national-provincial 
assemblies were abrogated and dismissed respectively (Rizvi 2000: 
86). This episode has been analysed by many scholars.
Alavi has viewed it as a ‘(civil) bureaucratic coup’ because it was 
Iskandar Mirza, a bureaucrat, who declared martial law. In addition, 
the new set-up included a secretary general and his planning 
committee which gave more power to the civil bureaucracy than 
military. Alavi and Jalal, among others, have argue that the fear of a 
general election that was supposed to be held in 1959 was the main 
reason behind martial law (Alavi 1990; Jalal 1995: 54).
 Alavi, unfortunately, has focused at the means and not the end. 
How strange it would seem that a ‘bureaucratic coup’ resulted in a 
military intervention that sent Iskandar Mirza into exile. In addition, 
why did the election — which had been postponed many times since 
1947 — become the cause for the coup?
It has been argued that it was a ‘military coup’ initiated by the 
military, bringing all power into its hands. The main cause was not 
the election but the projection of the military as ‘ruler’ in the Punjab-
based praetorian oligarchy. The military achieved this seniority due 
to its overwhelming politico-economic position in the security state 
of Pakistan. In addition, it sought political power to expand and 
consolidate itself as an independent economic actor. This shall be 
explained later.
Besides, the abrogation of the constitution may be seen in the 
light of ‘necessity doctrine’. It meant, it has been argued, that the legal 
and constitutional norms were irrelevant to the state of Pakistan and 
the so-called constitution was superficial in nature and character. The 
superficiality of legal-constitutional norms also showed the weakness 
of parliamentary institutions and civil society in Pakistan.
From 1958-69 the country was arbitrarily ruled by soldier-
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through arbitrary referendum. He introduced the system of ‘Basic 
Democracies’, supposedly to democratise the country. The Muslim 
League was factionalised. Resultantly, the Muslim League Convention 
was the king’s party.
Ayub also blessed the nation with a constitution in 1962. A 
war with India in September 1965 was, too, planned via Kashmir to 
humiliate the chronic foe. A year before, the soldier-president got re-
elected as president through the self-created Electoral College – the 
basic democrats (Hashami 2005: 147; Tariq Ali 1970: 132; Haqqani 
2005: 43-50; see also Ziring 1971: 12-85).
The Ayub-led military rule further benefited the praetorian 
oligarchy. For instance, his economic polices were carried out by the 
civil bureaucracy which was a medium to penetrate the state and into 
civil society. The regime’s cronies — be they of the landed-feudal 
class or bureaucrats — were favoured in terms of ‘superficial’ land 
reform and industrial licenses (Ziring 1971: 88). In addition, the 
regime amended Colonisation of Land Act, 1912, in 1965 to allot 
land (about 100,000 acres annually) to the  military (Siddiqa 2007). 
Besides, the Fauji Foundation gathered assets worth Rs152 million 
by the end of his rule (Siddiqa 2003).
Ayub’s era was anti urban and rural poor. His policies were 
discriminatory and the more depressed and discriminated were the 
majority Bengalis – politically, economically, and culturally. This 
mega-discrimination led to the six-point politics of the Awami League 
and its leader Mujibur Rehman in the mid 1960s. Poor communities 
of West Pakistan were also discriminated to such an extent that they 
took to the streets in late 1960s (Ziring 1971: 174-191; Tariq Ali 
1970: 23). The public uprising against Ayub mark the flaws in the 
work of propagandists, such as Huntington (1968: 250-255), who 
echoed military-led modernisation.
A newly created Pakistan People’s Party led by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
was instrumental in articulating the concerns of poor communities. 
Awami League did the same in the Eastern Wing. A defamed Ayub 
Khan proved a liability for the military which removed him from office 
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in March 1969 (Tariq Ali 1970: 210). The deposed soldier abrogated 
his own constitution and dismissed pro-regime assemblies. Martial 
Law once again engulfed Pakistan in March 1969. Constitutional 
norms once again proved irrelevant and ‘superficial’.
Thus, it has been argued that the civil bureaucracy-led praetorian 
oligarchy ruled the country from independence until 1958. The 
1958 military coup registered the military as a senior partner within 
the praetorian oligarchy. The military regime of Ayub Khan further 
consolidated the military both politically and economically. Legal 
and constitutional norms remained superficial and irrelevant. The 
urban-rural poor were extremely discriminated in both wings. This 
led to heightened agitation in politics, which was capitalised on 
by the People’s Party and Awami League. Resultantly, Ayub Khan 
unleashed further martial law.
Birth of a new state
This part of the article explains the partition and resultant 
disintegration of the state of Pakistan in 1971. This chapter also 
explains the new state, its politics, and the military. Finally, the 
chapter attempts to explain how the military consolidated its politico-
economic position within the praetorian oligarchy from 1971 until 
present.
Partition of Pakistan
General Yahya Khan assumed office of the chief martial law 
administration in March 1969. The military regime under Yahya was 
seen as continuation of the earlier military rule. I, however, would 
put the Yahya-led military rule in the praetorian oligarchy which 
remained undisturbed in the post-Ayub period.
Having assessed the public mood, Yahya, under his Legal 
Framework Order, undid the One-Unit1 and promised a general 
election in the country in February-March 1970. The People’s Party, 
Awami League, and other smaller parties started canvassing without 
pronounced agendas. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played upon the poor 
community’s emotionality in terms of promising them roti, kapra 
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‘autonomy’ maxim. The smaller parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami, 
aspired for pan-Islamism. And the Muslim League was lost with the 
fall of Ayub Khan (Waseem 1994: 243-254).
The election was staged with at least some reports of rigging. 
Though the military intelligence agencies predicted a mix-mandate, 
the People’s Party and Awami League made a clean sweep in West 
Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively. From a simple parliamentary 
democracy principle, the majority party was entitled to form 
government in the centre as well as East Pakistan.
But the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy could not accept the 
Bengalis ruling them. Therefore, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
(a Sindi-landed feudal), in representing the oligarchy, dismissed the 
public verdict. When the Bengalis resorted to agitational politics, 
Yahya Khan allowed military means to solve a political issue. In the 
wake of the civil war, the Bengali refugees proved a burden to India 
socially and economically. No wonder then that India exploited the 
situation through war against Pakistan. As a result, on 16 December 
1971, Pakistan was partitioned through the formation of the 
sovereign state of Bangladesh (Waseem 1994: 255-277).
Scholars so far have bypassed this partition and its ramifications. 
However, it has been argued that this partition marked the importance 
of non-religious identities. The creation of Bangladesh showed the 
victory of the two-culture theory whereby the dual-nation theory was 
not able to bind the two wings together. In addition, the partition 
of Pakistan confirmed the significance of ‘structural supremacy’ of 
the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy which, for its own political 
and economic interests, underestimated and degraded the majority 
Bengalis.
More importantly, the state of Pakistan virtually disintegrated. 
It was run by a non-elected apparatus at the time of partition, 
meaning that the legality and rule of law was absent. Moreover, it 
lost more than half of its population and territory in a sign of the 
state’s physical collapse. 
Thus, the partition of old Pakistan gave birth to a new state 
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which inherited the overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy 
and influential landed-feudal class. In other words, the new state 
structurally inherited the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy from the 
old Pakistan. In addition, Punjab once again emerged as a powerful 
province in terms of population and resources.
Politics of appeasement
The post-1971 Pakistani state structurally forced the military 
to retreat because the latter had been discredited by the masses due 
to its failure to guarantee even the territorial defense of the state. 
Therefore, the military handed over power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
with whom the civil-military bureaucracy had developed institutional 
understanding during the former’s association with the Ayub-Yahya 
regimes. For instance, Bhutto was sent to China by the Yahya regime 
at a time when the military operation in East Pakistan was at its peak.
In addition, he retrospectively represented the old West Pakistan. 
Therefore, he was the only leader of national standing who could be 
transferred authority. Therefore, Bhutto acted as the country’s first 
civilian chief martial law administrator as well as its president from 
late 1971 to 1973.
Bhutto and his politics (1971-77) have been discussed by many 
scholars. For instance, Burki (1980: 81-89), K.B. Sayeed (1980:  91) 
and Jalal (1995: 77-84) have analysed ‘Bhuttoism’ from a personalistic 
perspective, in that he was a feudal and once in power he wanted 
to maximise it at all costs. Shafqat (1997: 115-159) and Waseem 
(1994: 285-348) have, however, analysed the Bhutto phenomenon 
from a party politics perspective. These scholars have argued that 
Bhutto came to power due to the vote. To fulfil campaign promises, 
he turned to the politics of reformism. It was in the structure of 
reforms that resent grew among some groups or classes, and they 
brought him down. 
The ‘politics of reformism’ thesis of Shafqat and Waseem 
was partially true. Shafqat (1997:10-16), while formulating his 
‘dominant party political system’ for the 1971-77 period, has ignored 
the organisational weakness of the People’s Party. Thus, it has been 
argued that the period of the People’s Party was not what Shafqat 
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Waseem has, however, highlighted the organisational weakness 
of the People’s Party which caused Bhutto’s downfall. However, he 
has not touched the military’s politics which appeased Bhutto by 
returning to barracks in the wake of 1971 defeat. Therefore, I would 
tend to argue that it was the politics of appeasement — political and 
economic concessions — both on the part of Bhutto and the military 
during this period.
Bhutto was transferred power by the discredited military. In 
other words, he was appeased by an organisation which was a senior 
partner of the praetorian oligarchy which also represented the landed 
feudal. Bhutto, being of the landed feudal, sought about becoming 
authoritarian. Through that, he was to curtail the powers of a military 
which had previously ruled the country. Therefore, he restructured the 
military command and control structure. In addition, he abolished 
the civil service of Pakistan and unified all services though with 
military’s consent (Haqqani 2005:95; Shafqat 1977:167). Besides, 
he appeased the socialists within his party by giving them important 
portfolios, such as the finance ministry (Burki 1980: 140-143).
However, very soon he deployed the military in Balochistan 
in the name of national consolidation (Cohen 2004: 220). The 
Balochistan operation continued from 1973 until Bhutto’s downfall 
(Waseem 1994: 323-327). The intelligences agencies of the military, 
however, exploited the situation in the former’s favour (Haqqani 
2005: 172). The underlying assumption was to rejuvenate the morale 
of the armed forces so as to regain its previous political position.
Bhutto, in his rhetoric of appeasement, projected India as the 
enemy when the latter tested a nuclear device in 1974. The dynamics 
of the security state urged Bhutto to initiate the country’s first 
nuclear programme in the mid 1970s. In addition, during 1972-
77 the defense budget stood at about six percent of GNP (Shafqat 
1997:167). Thus, Bhutto appeased the military to prolong his stay 
in power.
By the mid 1970s, Bhutto had restructured his cabinet and 
replaced staunch socialists with members of the landed feudal, the 
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majority of whom came from Punjab. The entry of the landed-
feudal class into the corridors of power marked their importance in 
the praetorian oligarchy. In addition, he also appeased the religious 
forces by introducing Islamic measures, such as the banning of 
alcohol (Burki 1980: 193). The religious forces, however, along 
with the discriminated urban-rural poor, took to agitational politics 
and demanded an Islamic system. The Inter Services Intelligence 
(ISI) assisted and aided the religious forces in this respect (Haqqani 
2005:105-116). Thus, it has been argued that the clergy was an 
auxiliary to the military.
Bhutto, having sensed the situation, decided to hold general 
election in March 1977. His People’s Party emerged as a majority 
party. However, opposition in the form of the Pakistan National 
Alliance (PNA), refused to accept the results. They alleged Bhutto of 
massive rigging (Rizvi 2000: 232-235). Thus, the agitational politics 
of the PNA requested the military to take over.
The military matters
The new state witnessed martial law imposed by general Ziaul 
Haq military regime on 5 July, 1977, on charges of corruption and 
mismanagement of the economy by Bhutto. The latter was arrested 
and his polices reversed; the 1973 constitution was abrogated. Two 
years later, Bhutto was hanged by the military (Rizvi 2000:239).
Politically, Zia, like Ayub, held a referendum and became a 
soldier-president. The other partners in the praetorian oligarchy, 
especially those affected by Bhutto’s policies, applauded the military 
rule. The Afghan jihad of the 1980s against communist Soviet Union 
made Islamabad a frontline state in Washington. Subsequently, 
massive military aid (US$ 3.2 billion) and increased defense 
allocation strengthened the military at home. It became belligerent: 
it banned political parties, arrested anti-regime politicians and 
journalists, delayed oft-promised election, criminalised the civil 
society through a weapons-drug culture, Islamised the legal system 
and spilled ethnic-sectarian violence throughout Pakistan (Waseem 
1994: 367-388; Burki 1991: 16).
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Land Entitlement for Military Personnel
Rank Acreage
Major General and above 240 acres
Brigadiers and Colonels 150 acres
Lt. Colonels 124 acres
Lieutenants to Majors 100 acres
JCOs 64 acres
NCOs 32 acres
                                    Source: Ayesha Siddiqa (2007)
Likewise, the military operation against the nationalist Baloch 
in Balochistan could be explained in this context. The military-
led government started Development Projects in Gwadar which 
favoured Punjabis, including military (70 percent Punjabis). The 
Baloch resented the militarily and the conflict has continued (The 
Friday Times 29 October, 2004).
Thus, it has been argued that the apparent goal of the October 
coup — and also that of November (2007) — was to re-insitutionalise 
military rule and make politicians and civil society know that the 
military remained a powerful political force in Pakistan. However, 
the underlying objective of the coup was to gain political power to 
pursue economic interests authoritatively.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to explain why the military has 
remained a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan from a 
historical-structural perspective. In this respect, I have explored 
the hypothesis with respect to the colonial authority structure and 
partition-oriented structural dynamics. My analysis included the 
military in the colonial authority structure. The colonial military, 
along with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class, formed 
a praetorian oligarchy which has pursued its own political and 
economical interests in British India. In addition, I have analysed 
that the partition-oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory 
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(Kashmir) and population (Indian refugees) have affected politics and 
the military in Pakistan. Thus, it has been argued that the hypothesis 
holds and I have theoretically operationalised the hypothesis in 
terms of pre-partition ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to explain my research 
problem.
 The post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the pre-partition 
praetorian oligarchy based on Punjab. The civil-military bureaucracy 
has structurally emerged as an ‘overdeveloped’ institution which 
has an alliance with the landed-feudal class and has projected and 
institutionalised ‘Hindu India’ to pursue political and economic 
interests (see the Table 4).
Table 4   Evolution and consolidation of praetorian oligarchy in 
Pakistan
14 Aug. 1947-18 Oct. 1951 Politicians, oligarchically, ran the affairs of 
the state.
19 Oct.1951- 7 Oct. 1958 Civil bureaucracy dominated the political 
structure, in alliance with a section of 
politicians and the military.
7 Oct. 1958- 20 Dec. 1971 The military-led praetorian oligarchy 
dominated politics and the state.
20 Dec. 1971- 5 July 1977 Bhutto-led politicians ran the affairs in an 
oligarchic alliance with civil bureaucracy and 
the military
5 July 1977- present The military-led praetorian oligarchy has 
ruled the roost.
Source:  Data gathered from the existing accounts on Pakistan’s civil-
military relations.
The military, being part of the praetorian oligarchy, planned and 
fought a war against India over Kashmir in 1947-48. This exercise 
helped the oligarchy to rule authoritatively in the 1950s. The civil 
bureaucracy led the praetorian oligarchy in this period.
However from 1958 onward, the military has, from within the 
praetorian oligarchy, emerged as a powerful political actor due to 
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the 1970s it disengaged from politics due to its defeat in the 1971 
war and the country’s disintegration, yet it regained its prestigious 
position in 1977. It ruled belligerently in the1980s. However, it again 
disengaged from politics in the 1990s due to a changed geostrategic 
environment. But the real power remained with the men in uniform 
in terms of 58 (B) 2 during this period. 
The bureaucrat-feudal presidents, a part of the praetorian 
oligarchy, dismissed the so-called democratic governments formed 
by the landed—feudal class. In other words, the praetorian oligarchy 
politically remained dominant. In October 1999 —  and also, 
in November 2007 — the military overtly intervened to exile an 
authoritative civilian who attempted to curtail military’s politico-
economic activities. Since then, the military-led praetorian oligarchy 
ruled the country. The clergy was auxiliary to this praetorian 
oligarchic rule.
As the study explained, all the coups were primarily economic in 
nature. The military sought political power to act as an independent 
economic actor. It allocated land among its personnel to expand the 
institution socially and economically. The other components of the 
praetorian oligarchy would ally with the military to pursue their 
politico-economic interests. Thus, the political power has laid with 
the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy from 1947 partition until 
present. This power was exercised on none other but the urban-
rural poor. In the absence of any (lower) middle-class leadership and 
political organisation, they have suffered and died in despair. Their 
state of affairs could be gauged from the State Bank of Pakistan’s 
Inflation Monitor of August 2008. It stated: 
Inflationary pressures strengthened in the economy with CPI 
inflation (YoY) soaring to reach 25.3 percent during August 
2008 compared to 6.5 percent in the same month last year. 
Both food and non-food groups of CPI contributed in this 
upsurge in headline inflation. Food inflation (YoY) remained 
persistently high and was recorded at 34.1 percent compared 
to 8.6 percent in August 2007. This rising trend was mainly 
led by increase in the prices of some key food commodities 
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such as coriander seed powder (130 percent), pulse masoor 
(130 percent), rice irri (121 percent), wheat (76 percent), 
and maida (68 percent). Similarly, non-food inflation (YoY) 
also increased significantly reaching 18.7 percent in August 
2008 compared to 4.9 percent during the same month last 
year. Amongst the various components of CPI non-food 
group, transport and communication, house rent index (HRI), 
and fuel and lighting sub-group witnessed significant increase 
in inflation (YoY) during August 2008 compared to the same 
month last year. Other measures of inflation i.e. wholesale 
price index (WPI) and sensitive price indicator (SPI) also 
showed strong growth during the month under review. (Stat 
Bank of Pakistan 2010)
Finally, it has been argued that the theoretical framework in 
terms of the praetorian oligarchy was useful to civil-military relations 
in Pakistan. In addition, this article has developed theoretical concepts 
such as the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy, overdeveloped civil-
military bureaucracy, politics of appeasement, and military as pre-
partition phenomenon. They may be useful for future researchers.
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